We examine the impact of state level legislation against the hiring of unauthorized immigrants on employment opportunities among competing low-skilled workers. Our focus is on the role of E-Verify mandates and specifically, we test for effects of the 2007 Legal Arizona Workers Act (LAWA) on employment outcomes of low-skilled native-born and legal immigrant workers in Arizona. We use the synthetic control method developed by Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (2010) to select a group of states against which the labor market trends of Arizona can be compared. Our results suggest that contrary to its intent, the Legal Arizona Workers Act does not appear to have improved labor market outcomes of competing legal low-skilled workers. In fact, we find some evidence of diminished employment and increased unemployment among legal low-skilled workers in Arizona. These findings are concentrated on the largest demographic group of workers -non-Hispanic white men. While they are less likely to find employment, those who do have on average higher earnings as a result of LAWA. The pattern of results points to a labor supply contraction as the primary mechanism at work.
Introduction
Lawmakers in the U.S. Congress are once again considering changes to the country's immigration policy though comprehensive immigration reform. The future of these efforts remains uncertain and not many policy experts will be surprised if these efforts meet the fate of past unsuccessful attempts. A key reason behind the Congressional gridlock on immigration is the controversial issue of how to address the country's unauthorized immigrant population, which has grown from about 3 million in the late 1980s to around 11.7 million in 2012 (Passel, Cohn and Gonzalez-Barrera, 2013) . Although the concerns regarding unauthorized immigrants cover a broad range of issues, one frequently cited apprehension is that the presence of such a large number of unauthorized workers negatively affects labor market outcomes of legal workers.
In this paper, we take advantage of legislation in Arizona against the hiring of unauthorized immigrants to assess whether these changes had any impacts on the employment opportunities of low-skilled U.S. born and legal immigrant workers. Our previous research finds that this policy -the 2007 Legal Arizona Workers Act -significantly and quickly decreased the state's unauthorized immigrant population and limited their employment opportunities, especially in formal wage and salary work (Bohn, Lofstrom and Raphael (forthcoming) and Bohn and Lofstrom (2013) ). The Legal Arizona Workers Act (LAWA) is the first of now numerous state policies to require employers to use of E-Verify, a federal electronic system, to check the work authorization of new hires, and to set forth sanctions for employers who do not.
LAWA and similar policies in other states respond to the fact that employment is the primary draw for most unauthorized immigrants. Arizona is a state leading the charge against Very little is known about the impacts of these laws but our previous research shows that LAWA induced sizeable responses among the unauthorized population. Bohn, Lofstrom and Raphael (forthcoming) finds that the population of non-citizen Hispanic immigrants in Arizonaa high proportion of whom are unauthorized immigrants -fell by more than 90,000 due to LAWA. Bohn and Lofstrom (2013) extends the work to assess whether the policy affected labor market outcomes of unauthorized immigrants. We find evidence of a substantial decrease in the 1 SB 1070 targets unauthorized immigrants directly, as opposed to employers, and criminalizes failure to carry immigration documents and give the police broad power to detain anyone suspected of being in the country illegally. The constitutionality of the law is in question and prior to enactment a federal judge issued an injunction blocking the most controversial provisions, including the one requiring police to check individual's immigration status while enforcing other laws if there was reason to believe the person was in the country illegally. 2 Although the legislation has faced a number of legal challenges, it has been upheld by the federal district and appellate courts. The challenges to LAWA focus on the right of states to legislate on immigration enforcement. The U.S. Supreme Court heard arguments in the case, Chamber of Commerce et al v Whiting, in December 2010 and ruled in favor of the legislation in May 2011. The clearing of the constitutionality hurdle may spur additional interest in passing such laws. rate of formal employment by about 11 percentage points among likely unauthorized immigrants, defined as Hispanic non-naturalized low-skilled men, as well as a doubling of the self-employment rate. The timing of these changes coincides with LAWA and the changes are not found in comparison states. With these substantial impacts on the unauthorized population, the policy change in Arizona appears to be an excellent opportunity to assess whether competing authorized low-skilled workers benefitted from the legislation.
A few papers have assessed the impact of E-Verify on the labor market outcomes of legal workers in a context broader than Arizona. Good (2013) estimates sizeable negative employment effects among competing authorized workers as a result of omnibus state policies, which include E-Verify mandates and other state actions. Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak (2012 Bansak ( , 2013 provide some of the first evidence on the impact of E-Verify on employment and wages among native-born non-Hispanics, a relatively broad group. Nationwide, in states that passed Everify laws (of varying degree), native-born non-Hispanic men are more likely to be employed (2 percentage points) and at higher wages (nearly 3 percent) than similar men in other states. We add to this literature by explicitly addressing the endogeneity of E-Verify passage and creating robust counterfactual, especially crucial for assessing employment impacts in a recessionary period.
E-Verify as a State-level Enforcement Tool
The failure of federal reform has spurred an unprecedented level of state legislative activity in immigration policy in recent years. The new state laws related to employment of unauthorized immigrants vary greatly in terms of restrictiveness and implementation. Most of the comprehensive laws include mandated use of E-Verify to varying degree. Arizona's LAWA was the first comprehensive mandate issued and remains arguably the most restrictive.
E-Verify
E-Verify is a voluntary online system created and managed by the federal government to provide information to employers about whether an individual is authorized to work in the United States. E-Verify checks workers' Form I-9 information for authenticity and work authorization status against Social Security Administration (SSA) and Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) databases. The system applies to all workers, citizens and noncitizens alike, and employers are not permitted to use E-Verify until a new hire has been made.
E-Verify provides fast results, if identity and work authorization are confirmed-which, according to Westat (2009) , occurs about 95 percent of the time. When confirmation is not granted ("tentative non confirmation" or TNC), the employee may appeal. While a TNC is being contested by a new hire, employers are not allowed to dismiss the worker solely on the basis of the record. If an employee fails to or is unable to correct a TNC within two weeks, employers must terminate the employee. Cited problems with E-Verify include delays in correcting tentative non-confirmations, erroneous confirmations, and insufficient capacity as more employers enroll. Intensive refinement of the system in recent years has led to improvements, especially in error rates.
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The costs -primarily time and energy -of correcting errors fall on the new hires as well as on local DHS and SSA offices where individuals must go to correct errors.
Verification can be circumvented if employers avoid use or if applicants submit false documents.
A photo identification tool was added to E-Verify in 2009 to address this latter concern, though most E-Verify polices include penalties for identity theft as well.
The results of E-Verify at this time are not reported to any agency responsible for immigration enforcement. That is, even if a new hire is found to be unauthorized, these results are not transmitted to DHS or ICE for investigation, detainment, or deportation of the individual.
Thus, enforcing use of E-Verify must come from an external source.
The 2007 Legal Arizona Workers Act
The Legal Arizona Workers Act (LAWA) was signed into law in July 2007 and enacted on January 1, 2008. LAWA mandates the use of E-Verify by all employers in Arizona to ensure the legal authorization to work for all new hires. The law also imposes sanctions on employers who "knowingly" hire unauthorized immigrants: a business license suspension for the first offense and license revocation upon a second. LAWA is unique among subsequent state EVerify mandates in that it covers all firms, not just public agencies or those with state government contracts. It also mandates that employers of all sizes use E-Verify as of the implementation date. Many states that have since implemented E-Verify often phase in employers by business size and/or include exemptions. LAWA does include an exemption we find to be highly relevant: independent contractors are not subject to the mandate. Its broad range makes LAWA a good example of state legislation that mimics recent federal reform proposals.
Importantly, Arizona is also one of a few places where all employers have been required to use E-Verify for a sufficient period of time to allow for a reliable empirical evaluation.
We expect that LAWA's impacts to-date largely stem from a deterrent or compliance effect prompted by the E-Verify mandate rather than from employer sanctioning. To date few (2010)). This correlates to roughly 50% of all new hires in the state.
Theoretical Predictions of the Labor Market Impacts of E-Verify Mandates
The intention of E-Verify mandates in general and LAWA specifically is to reduce the unauthorized immigrant population by deterring the hiring of unauthorized workers. Legislation such as LAWA can potentially achieve this goal by affecting both the supply and demand side of the labor market. The extent to which these labor market effects change the employment opportunities of competing authorized workers depends largely on their substitutability with targeted unauthorized immigrants.
On the supply side, the E-Verify requirement makes it more difficult for unauthorized immigrants to find work in Arizona, making the state less desirable for unauthorized workers and ostensibly increasing employment opportunities of competing legal workers. Our previous work finds strong evidence of a labor supply effect among unauthorized; the law induced a noticeable decline in the unauthorized population and a decline in employment among unauthorized workers who continued to reside in Arizona. Employment declines were attenuated by a shift from salary work to self-employment among the targeted immigrants. These results are consistent with -but not limited to -a decline in labor supply. All else equal, substitutable legal workers should experience improved labor market opportunities.
However, LAWA may also impact labor demand in a number of ways, making impacts on authorized workers ambiguous. The E-Verify mandate increases the cost of hiring generally speaking, potentially driving down labor demand. 4 But in particular, if employers can distinguish between unauthorized and authorized workers, employer sanctions increase the cost to employers of hiring unauthorized immigrants, thus reducing employers' desire to hire them and increasing their demand for legal workers. Standard labor demand theory predicts that this would induce reinforcing downward effects on the employment opportunities for unauthorized immigrants but offsetting effects on other workers.
Whether these standard effects occur depends in large part on the degree to which authorized and unauthorized workers compete with one another in the labor market. But the substitutability of authorized workers for unauthorized is limited by differences in skills of workers and their availability. Overall, this suggests that the labor market effects of LAWA are likely to vary by skill, nativity, ethnicity, gender, and the interaction of these dimensions and that, if there are benefits to be had, those authorized workers most likely to benefit are those most closely substitutable for unauthorized workers. It is clear that there are many standard labor demand channels through which LAWA may impact authorized workers. Since it is impossible to theoretically predict the net effects on employment of the channels discussed here, analyzing the impacts of these laws on native and legal immigrants requires an empirical analysis.
Data and Empirical Strategy
To assess the labor market effects of LAWA on authorized workers, we analyze data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) data collected between 1998 and 2010. These data provide details on the employment, work, and earnings of individuals in each state as well as information on race/ethnicity, education, age, and other demographic characteristics including immigration status (native-US born or foreign-born naturalized citizen, or not a citizen). The CPS data does not allow for direct identification of work authorization status. However, we estimate that in Arizona upwards of 80 to 90 percent of noncitizen men of working age and of Hispanic origin with relatively low levels of education (high school or less) are likely to be unauthorized (Bohn, Lofstrom and Raphael (forthcoming) based on Passel and Cohn (2009a) ).
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For the present analysis of competing workers, then, we utilize the same criterion but switch self-reported citizenship to require naturalized or native-born status. While these citizenship questions are unlikely to be reported with no error and some noncitizen men may be authorized to work (for example, via nonimmigrant visa program), as defined the worker groups we examine contain a high share of truly authorized individuals.
As described above, LAWA's effects might vary to the degree employers can substitute similar workers and distinguish unauthorized from authorized workers. For that reason, we examine three groups defined by race-ethnicity and citizenship status with plausibly varying degrees of similarity with unauthorized immigrants: Foreign-born naturalized citizen Hispanics, Native-born Hispanics, and Native-born non-Hispanic whites. Among all groups, we restrict analysis to working age men (16-60) with high school education or less. While other racialethnic group outcomes are of interest (in particular, native-born non-Hispanic blacks), the small population of minority groups beyond those of Hispanic origin in Arizona preclude robust analysis. The native-born, less-skilled male workforce in Arizona is comprised primarily of white men (roughly 60 percent), followed by Hispanic men (30 percent). To the extent that authorized workers defined here are not perfect substitutes for unauthorized workers in Arizona -or do not fully capture the true substitute workers -our estimates may attenuate LAWA's true effect.
The CPS provides a wealth of information on labor market outcomes and at high frequency (monthly). We pool monthly data within year in order to obtain sufficient sample size for analysis on the narrowly defined population groups necessitated by this study. The average sample size within the population groups of interest is given in the first row of Table 1 . We restrict our sample period to 1998-2009. Additional years of data are available; however, harsh immigration policies (namely the controversial SB 1070) were passed in Arizona after 2009, potentially biasing estimates of LAWA's impact beyond 2009. Larger samples are available in the American Community Survey, but do not provide the long time series and high frequency data necessitated by our empirical approach, discussed below. We estimate impacts on a number of outcomes: employment, unemployment, and labor force participation and earnings measured at the annual, weekly, and hourly level. Table 1 presents the average values of these outcome variables for the three population groups of interest, in both Arizona and the potential comparison states.
In order to identify the causal impact of LAWA on employment outcomes in Arizona, we employ the synthetic control approach of Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (2010) . Key to the identification strategy is charting the appropriate counterfactual path for Arizona in absence of LAWA. There are a number of approaches one could employ. One is to select states that share similar population and economic characteristics and trends as Arizona; for example, the states bordering Arizona (a traditional difference-in-difference approach). Another would be to employ a data-driven search for comparison states based on pre-LAWA population and employment characteristics and trends (the synthetic control method of Abadie et al (2010) ). We focus on the latter because it is arguably the most reliable and essentially incorporates the first strategy. It allows the data to tell us which states best match Arizona's pre-LAWA experience.
The synthetic control method allows for robust analysis in the single policy changesingle state context. We summarize the methodology for charting a counterfactual post-LAWA path for Arizona here. The basic idea is to generate a comparison group from a convex combination of states in a large donor pool. Let the index j =(0,1,…,J) denote states. The value j=0 corresponds to Arizona and j=(1,…,J) correspond to each of the other J states that are candidate contributors to the control group (or in the language of Abadie et. al, the donor pool). 
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where V is a 9x9, diagonal positive-definite matrix with diagonal elements providing the relative weights for the contribution of the square of the elements in the vector 0 1 F FW  to the objective function being minimized.
Once an optimal weighting vector * W is chosen, both the pre-intervention path as well as the post-intervention values for the dependent variable in "synthetic Arizona" can be tabulated by calculating the corresponding weighted average for each year using the donor states with positive weights. The post-intervention values for the synthetic control group serve as our counterfactual outcomes for Arizona.
Our principal estimate of the impacts of LAWA on labor market outcomes uses the synthetic control group to calculate a simple difference-in-differences estimate. Specifically, define Lofstrom, and Raphael (forthcoming) and Bohn and Lofstrom (2013) . In short, we argue that while LAWA was implemented at the beginning of the Great Recession, it was the result of a lengthy legislative process that began well before -that is, was exogenous to -the recession.
Second, we find no evidence of coincident immigration enforcement either at the border or internal to Arizona that could have generated the same effects we identify via the synthetic control.
Nonetheless, the "Great Recession" occurred at approximately the same time of the enactment of LAWA, presenting a potentially confounding factor. Our empirical approach comparing trends in Arizona to other states accounts for any changes that affect the country as a whole (or the selected comparison states). However, one of the industries hit hardest, construction, is a leading employer of less-skilled workers. Furthermore, construction is one of the biggest industries in Arizona (representing close to 11 percent of total private employment in 2006). To validate our empirical approach, we assess official statistics on employment trends in Arizona and neighboring states during the recession.
The recent recession caused a clear reduction in Arizona's workforce. Importantly, the recession was precipitated by a housing crisis, which brought new housing construction to a near standstill. The fact that many unauthorized immigrants and lessskilled workers generally are employed in the construction sector means that they may have been particularly affected by the recession. However, a look at construction employment data reveals no evidence that Arizona's construction industry fared much differently in the recession than its neighboring areas (Figure 2) .
Overall, the data indicates that while Arizona's labor market was strongly affected by the recession, so were other states', including its neighbors. The similarity in trends indicates that our empirical strategy is appropriate for identifying causality despite the recent recession.
Empirical Results -Did LAWA have labor market effects on authorized workers?
LAWA induced a sizeable population reduction among unauthorized men in the Arizona labor markets. Presuming that men born in the U.S. or naturalized citizens with similar education levels are substitutes, the labor supply shock alone should have improved their employment outcomes. However, as detailed above, a number of demand-related adjustments due to LAWA are also plausible. In this section we analyze employment rates and wage levels among authorized subgroups to better understand LAWA's impacts and possibly mechanisms.
LAWA Effects on Employment
We begin our analysis of whether LAWA affected employment opportunities of low-skilled authorized workers in Arizona by examining employment rates (defined here as the ratio of persons employed). As discussed above, for those workers who remained in Arizona following LAWA, a variety of employment effects are plausible. To the extent that firms are hiring and are in compliance with LAWA, authorized workers who are close substitutes for unauthorized workers are more likely to find employment. However, three effects in the opposite direction may also be at play: scale effects due the increased cost of hiring, statistical discrimination against observably similar authorized workers, or complementarity between authorized and unauthorized workers. For these reasons, the impact of LAWA on authorized workers is theoretically ambiguous.
The data indicates that all authorized low-skilled men in Arizona experienced a post-LAWA drop in employment. Figure 3 shows that both before and after the passage of LAWA in 2007, the employment rate of less-skilled naturalized Hispanic men was higher than that of non-Hispanic native-born white men, which was in turn higher than that of Hispanic native-born men.
(averaging 85 and 72 percent and 64 percent over the entire period , respectively). The employment rate of native-born men fell more drastically -over 11 percentage pointsfollowing LAWA than it did for the other groups (7 points for naturalized Hispanic immigrants and 6 points for native-born Hispanics).
To probe the employment changes further, we apply the synthetic control approach and use the comparison states, which mimic Arizona's 1998-2006 employment trend. In this exercise, we omit from the donor pool four states with broadly applied restrictions on the employment of unauthorized immigrants (Mississippi, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Utah) even though the timing of their legislation post-dates LAWA. In identifying synthetic control states for placebo tests on each of the other states in the donor pool, we omit Arizona. Moreover, the donor pool of states is further restricted due to sample size limitations in the monthly CPS, and these limitations vary across the groups of workers we analyze. Generally the donor pool is most restricted for the group of naturalized Hispanic men and is broader for native-born men. As stated previously, these sample size restrictions to some extent drive our focus on the largest group -native-born white men.
We assess whether the observed declines in employment among low-skilled authorized workers in Arizona following LAWA stand out from the counterfactual trend based on states in the donor pool. Figure 4 shows that prior to the passing of LAWA, the employment rate of native-born non-Hispanic white men in Arizona matched those of in the synthetic control ("synthetic Arizona") quite well. Pre-intervention differences between Arizona and the synthetic control group average near zero (0.0007). Hence, the synthetic control approach passes the first hurdle -succeeds in obtaining of convex combination of states that match Arizona's pre-LAWA trend. After 2007, however, we observe a divergent pattern. In the two post-LAWA years the employment rate for non-Hispanic white low-skilled men in Arizona is, on average, 4 percentage points lower than in the counterfactual.
Average differences between Arizona and the synthetic control are calculated in the pre-LAWA period (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) and post-LAWA period (2008) (2009) The set of difference-in-difference point estimates estimated from this placebo distribution, DD , is used to calculate the p-value and rank of AZ DD . These statistics are given in the last two columns of Table 2 . We find that the difference-in-difference estimate for Arizona stands out as a clear outlier in the distribution of placebo estimates. The 4.4 point decline is the third largest decline among all forty-five states in the donor pool, and is statistically significant at the 7% level (the minimum p-value would be 0.022).
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Among the competing groups of Hispanic authorized workers, we find less convincing evidence of a decline in employment due to LAWA. The difference-in-difference estimates for both Hispanic native-born and naturalized men do not stand out among the placebo distribution of the synthetic control. The donor pool of states contributing to the distribution is smaller for each of these groups due to sample size, but are large enough that we would expect to detect significant impacts if they exist. If anything, the 4.5 point decline in employment among naturalized Hispanic immigrants is closer to significance and combined with the similar result for white native-born men suggests that authorized low-skilled workers may have faced a small decline in employment following LAWA. Using the size of the low-skilled working age nonHispanic white male population in Arizona in 2006 as the base (about 409,000), our estimates suggest that LAWA caused a drop in employment of roughly 18,000 such workers. If our estimated decline in employment among Hispanic naturalized immigrants is in fact valid but we fail to detect due to sample size limitations, the 4.5 point drop for this group would translate to roughly 9,800 workers.
Our previous work (Bohn and Lofstrom, 2013 ) documented a shift in employment from formal work (wage and salary jobs) to less formal (as measured by self-employment) among likely unauthorized men in Arizona due to LAWA. In the same study, we found no such evidence among competing low-skilled authorized workers -the same groups examined here.
Thus, we next turn to additional outcome measures that may shed light on the effects of LAWA for authorized men.
The second and third panels of Table 2 present the impacts of LAWA on the unemployment rate and share of workers out of the labor force, among the three low-skilled authorized groups of men in Arizona. Overall, we fail to detect any strong statistical relationship between the passage of LAWA and unemployment or labor force participation. Among native-born lowskilled workers, unemployment rates jumped in Arizona relative to the synthetic control following LAWA on the order of 2 to 4 points. While towards the top range of estimates found in any state under the placebo test, the estimates are significant at only the 20% level, outside the typically acceptable range. For white native-born in particular, we find a 1.8 point increase in the unemployment rate (shown graphically in Figure 6 and 7). The differential change in unemployment among naturalized immigrants is close to zero.
LAWA-induced changes in labor force participation for these groups go in different directions and are similarly imprecise. Following LAWA, a higher share of white native-born and Hispanic naturalized low-skilled men reported non-participation in the labor market relative to the synthetic control (1.8 and 3.7 points, respectively). But a higher share of Hispanic nativeborn workers reported participation in the labor market, relatively speaking. Again, however, the results are not statistically significant at levels that would lead us to make strong conclusions.
Note that all results presented in Table 2 Combined with previous results, the pattern of findings suggests that LAWA had small, negative impacts on authorized workers, experienced as employment declines not likely to have been compensated by a shift to self-employment. Rather, we observe a disproportionate (though not strongly significant) increase in unemployment and exiting the labor force. The strongest findings suggest that employment effect effects were concentrated on low-skilled white workers, who experienced a small but statistically significant drop in employment and likely became unemployed or exited the labor force as a result. Considering the simultaneous outflow of unauthorized low-skilled immigrants from Arizona's labor force, these findings on slightly diminished employment opportunities among competing workers suggests that not only labor supply was constricted but employers likely reduced their demand to some extent as a result of LAWA.
LAWA Effects on Earnings
We next turn to earnings data to shed more light on plausible mechanisms driving employment declines observed for both authorized and -from previous work -unauthorized men in Arizona due to LAWA. If the employment decreases were entirely due to a decline in labor demand (for instance a purely scale effect due to increased cost of hiring), we would expect a corresponding decline in wages. If the employment declines were due entirely to a labor supply contraction, however, we would expect an increase in wages.
Assessing wage outcomes in the manner of this study is challenging. As discussed earlier, the synthetic control requires high frequency data over a long time period and our research question pertains to relatively small demographic groups. Questions on individual earnings are only asked of a large enough sample in the month of March in the CPS (the "Annual Social and Economic Supplement"). And even though this is a quite large sample relative to other months of the survey, it is not sufficient to estimate robust earnings outcomes for enough states to conduct the synthetic control approach on any of our subgroups except non-Hispanic
White native-born low-skilled men. Fortunately -likely for similar reasons -this is the subgroup for which we estimated the most strongly significant and consistent results in terms of employment outcomes. Thus, we focus in this section exclusively on the earnings outcomes of non-Hispanic white native-born working age men with a high school education or less.
We utilize both reported earnings in a respondent's current job (the "usual" earnings per week) and reported wage and salary earnings for the full year prior to the survey. In both cases we align the reference period for the earnings question with the pre-and post-LAWA analysis years. Thus we use different samples and different respondents to create the two sets of earnings outcome variables at the state level: 1999-2010 surveys for the "earnings last year" outcomes and 1998-2009 surveys for the "current earnings" outcomes. The "earnings last year" outcomes we calculate at the state-year level reflect earnings of state residents who did not move between surveys. Though we expect low-skilled white male migration rates to be quite low, as they typically are compared to other groups, a strong selectivity in the flow could bias our results but the direction is a priori unclear. A negatively selected outflow (for example those leaving because they earn low wages or are unemployed) may lead to an overestimate in the DD framework, whereas a positively selected outflow (for example high ability workers leaving for better opportunities) may lead to an understatement of LAWA's true effect. Table 3 Higher relative wages in Arizona following LAWA for low-skilled native-born white men are estimated regardless of which set of survey questions are utilized. Effects on average weekly earnings measured over the entire year are slightly smaller, possibly reflecting job loss, job change, or migration during the full year. On an annual basis, earnings in Arizona for this subgroup were $5500 higher on average -and $1400 higher at the median -following LAWA than in the synthetic control. All estimates are in the tails of the placebo distribution among donor pool states, but results pertaining to mean earnings are more strongly outliers. Also, hourly earnings are relatively higher by about $2 in Arizona following LAWA. This last result on hourly wages affirms that it was not simply an adjustment in hours worked that generated earnings changes at the weekly or annual level.
The evident increase in wages for low-skilled native-born white men following LAWA, coupled with their falling employment rate, suggests the primary mechanism at play was a constriction in labor supply. This does not preclude a concomitant shrinking of labor demand, of smaller magnitude.
In addition, because data does not permit assessment of wages among competing groups of Hispanic workers, we are limited in the ability to draw strong conclusions about the likelihood employers engage in statistical discrimination as a result of LAWA. We find patterns of restricted employment opportunities (though imprecise) among Hispanic naturalized low-skilled men, perhaps the most likely to be impacted by statistical discrimination. Lacking better data on changes in earnings, however, it is impossible to discern whether or how much labor supply and demand shocks generated these patterns. Statistical discrimination could present itself as a demand shock for this group but absent among competing white workers, for example.
Conclusions
Using the synthetic control approach for assessing the impact of a single policy change in single area, we estimate the impact of the Legal Arizona Workers Act of 2007 on labor market outcomes for legal workers in Arizona. Evidence to-date implies that LAWA was largely successful in meeting its goal of deterring unauthorized immigration to the state and preventing employment of unauthorized workers. In previous work, we estimated a roughly 17 percent decline in unauthorized population of the state and an 11 percentage point decline in formal employment both suggesting worsening labor market conditions for unauthorized due to LAWA. However, we also identified a shift towards informal employment, as measured by the 8 point increase in self-employment among unauthorized workers due to LAWA, hinting at one unintended consequence of the policy. In this paper we examine outcomes for workers likely to compete with -or substitute for -unauthorized immigrants. We find, in sum, no evidence that LAWA improved the labor market outcomes for low-skilled legal workers. In fact, we find some evidence of the opposite, which may be viewed as an additional unintended consequence of the policy.
Specifically, we find restricted employment opportunities -though much smaller than among unauthorized workers and non-existent for some demographic subgroups. We find the strongest pattern of evidence towards slightly lower employment levels but higher earnings among competing low-skilled white men. These findings point towards a labor supply shock as the primary mechanism by which LAWA impacted Arizona's labor market.
In particular, we find that low-skilled native born white men in Arizona faced a lower employment rate on the order of 4 percent due to LAWA. Their unemployment rate increased by 2 points and the share who are out of the labor force increased as well, but these effect cannot be reliably attributed to LAWA. The earnings of this group, among those who were employed, increased as a result -likely of the shock to labor supply.
Although Arizona's E-Verify mandate achieved its goal of deterring unauthorized immigration and employment, it also generated unintended consequences on the labor market.
In addition to constricting employment among unauthorized immigrants, LAWA also reduced employment opportunities among some low-skilled legal workers. Though these negative employment effects are very small in magnitude, they are ostensibly the opposite of hoped-for effects among some supporters of the law. However, for the largest group of low-skilled authorized men in Arizona, non-Hispanic whites, they earned higher wages on average as a result. Impacts on other, smaller, groups of low-skilled authorized workers remain unknown and are worthy of further study. 
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